The Wright Lawsuit by Freiwald, David
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace 
Education & Research 
Volume 23 
Number 1 JAAER Fall 2013 Article 8 
Fall 2013 
The Wright Lawsuit 
David Freiwald 
dfreiwald@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Freiwald, D. (2013). The Wright Lawsuit. Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 23(1). 
https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2013.1604 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
The Wright Lawsuit 
THE WRIGHT LAWSUIT 
David Frezwald 
Abstract 
While the flights of the Wnght brothers over a century ago have enshnned their names m aeronautical history, 
only slightly less important are the lawsuits brought forth by the brothers m defense of thetr mvention. From 1906 
to 1917 the Wnght brothers mamtatned a successful stranglehold on the development and production of the airplane 
m the United States. This paper exammes that history, the ensumg litigation, and the impact that the Wnght brothers 
actions had upon the readiness of the U.S. m World War I. 
The Wright Lawsuit 
The Wnght brothers were granted a patent by the 
U.S. Patent Office m 1906 for a flymg machme (U.S. Patent 
No. 821,393, 1906). Thts patent was based on the 
application they had submitted m 1903 that had mcluded a 
detailed descnption and drawmgs oftherr control system as 
applied to a glider (Crouch, 1981). Therr application 
described wmg warpmg, as well as the entire system that 
allowed the arrcraft to be controlled m forward flight 
(Wnght & Wnght, 2011 ). The Wnghts had also stated m 
therr application that a feature like ailerons could provtde 
lateral control (U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, 
2005). Obtatntng a patent meant that no one could copy the 
Wnghts' design without therr pemnss1on and without 
paymgthem a royalty. However, the success of the Wnghts' 
design, bolstered by Chanute's subsequent publication of 
therr achievements, proved impossible for other arrcraft 
designers to ignore. Furthermore, the concept of lateral 
control was so baste to any arrcraft design that, without it, 
no arrcraft could have flown successfully (Heppenheimer, 
2003). 
Wright and Wright v. the World: A Primer 
After the success of the June Bug, the members of 
Alexander Graham Bell's Aenal Expenment Association 
designed and built its final arrplane, the Silver Dart. It was 
the first Amencan arrcraft built by a team other than the 
Wnght brothers that performed well enough to be 
considered a practical arrcraft(Goddard, 2003). Bell told the 
members that they had not trespassed on the Wnght patent. 
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In the midst of these discussions, Curtiss received a 
telegram from Augustus Hemng suggesting that the two 
form a partnership to build airplanes (Shulman, 2002). 
Curtiss unveiled the Aeronautical Society machme, 
which he called the Golden Flyer, on June 16, 1909 flymg 
it from Moms Park m the Bronx. To further differentiate his 
arrplane designs and the Wnghts', he mounted ailerons 
between the wmgs of the biplane. On July 17, he flew the 
Golden Flyer for 25 miles and captured the Scientific 
Amencan Trophy for the second year m a row (Shulman, 
2002). Thts exceeded the Wnghfs patience and Wilbur filed 
a patent-mfrmgement suit agamst Curtiss on August 16 and 
another on August 19 seekmg to prevent the Aeronautical 
Society from flymg the Golden Flyer (Banner, 2008). 
Curtiss' subsequent success at Rheims did little to assuage 
Wilbur's anger (Brady, 2000). 
The Wrights' Position: A Propositional Fallacy 
Because of the expenences and values gamed from 
therr clergyman father, the brothers could be best described 
as hyper-vigilant towards those whom they perceived as less 
ethically bound and therefore likely to steal therr mvention 
(Howard, 1988). This mmdset led to the selection of the 
isolation of Kitty Hawk, the silver pamt of the arrcraft, and 
the retreat to Dayton - all founded m a belief that the press 
and public scrutiny would result ma loss of control oftherr 
design (Brady, 2000). Orville warned Curtiss on July 20, 
1908, "We do not mtend to give permission to use the 
patented features of our machines for exht"bitions or m a 
commercial way. [ ... ] If it is your desire to enter the 
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exhibition bus1Dess, we would be glad to take up the matter 
of a license to operate under our patents for that purpose" 
(Wnght & Wnght, 2011, p. 907). Clearly, the Wnghts saw 
their patent applymg to all airplane flight as a consequence 
of their successful design (Banner, 2008). This belief was so 
broadly applied that it led to an unnamed Curtiss employee 
to remark, "If you Jump ID the arr and flap your hands, the 
Wnght Brothers will sue!" {White, 2011, para. 1) 
As Bradshaw (1992) notes, it is known from the 
literature that the Wnght's progress was wholly iterative: 
they did not use the traditional design-build-test feedback 
loop of a sole-source 1Dventor, they focused on the 
refinement of components us1Dg knowledge obta1Ded from 
Chanute and others. No 1Dvention, no scientific discovery, 
no work of art, no human endeavor happens ID an btstoncal 
vacuum. There are always other factors - cultural, political, 
and personal - that 1Dfluence the outcome of a SIDgle event. 
So it was with the 1Dvention of the airplane. A translation of 
Lilienthal's Bir4flight as the Basis of Aviation (1911) was 
discovered ID the Special Collections area of the Embry-
Rtddle library with evtdentiary markmgs from the U.S. 
Court of Clauns 1Ddicating that the book belonged to the 
Wnghts at the time of its seizure ID 1929, pnma facie 
evidence that the knowledge that made their first powered 
flight possible was not entirely self-synthesized. Though the 
pnnting of the text postdates their first flight the content 
withm precedes it by a decade and a half. 
Unfortunately for Curtiss, when the final verdict 
came ID 1913 Orville Wnght, now without Wilbur, was the 
ummstakable WlllDer. With all delays and appeals exhausted, 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Curtiss to 
cease makmg airplanes with two ailerons that operated 
strnultaneously m opposite directions (Freudenthal, 1949). 
After consulting with Henry Ford, their mutual lawyer 
encouraged Curtiss to bait Orville to reopen the litigation by 
dev1s1Dg a new configuration for lateral control us1Dg the 
Langley aerodrome that hung ID the Smithsoman (Kelly, 
1989). The idea was to persuade the court that Curtiss' plane 
was based on Langley's design, not on the Wnghts', an 
attempt that was unsuccessful, but ensured that the case 
dragged on. Ford's lawyer was able to persuade the court to 
temporarily stay the old verdict, and the legal challenges 
began agam (Shulman, 2002). 
The suit finally ended with the start of World War 
I when the aircraft manufacturers established the 
Manufacturers' Aircraft Association to coordinate wartime 
aircraft rnanufactunng ID the United States and formed a 
patent pool with the approval of the U.S. government Kane, 
2003). All patent litigation ceased automatically and 
Page 10 
royalties were reduced to one percent and the free exchange 
of 1Dventions and ideas took place among all the arrframe 
builders. While this arrangement was to have lasted only for 
the duration of the war, the litigation was never renewed at 
the end of the war ID 1918. By thts time, Orville had sold his 
mterest m the Wnght Company to a group of New York 
financiers and had retired from the busmess (Kelly, 1989). 
For the war effort, however, the damage had already been 
done. 
The Effect of the Lawsuit upon the Development of 
Aviation 10 the United States 
The aeronautical world m 1918 would be 
unrecognizable to Wilbur Wnght who had left it only six 
years earlier. As late as 1914, the worldwide aircraft 
mdustry employed only a few hundred workers. By 1918, 
over 350,000 people were dependent upon the new mdustry 
that had manufactured over 50,000 aircraft as a consequence 
of World War I (Goddard, 2003). 
By the time the United States had entered World 
War I, other countnes had pulled far ahead m production. 
As early as 1913, a year before hostilities commenced on the 
continent, France appropnated $7 4 million for aviation. By 
contrast, America's spending of$125,000 approxunated that 
offiulgaria {Goddard, 2003). When the assassmation forthe 
Archduke catapulted the continent mto war there were 
already several hundred servtceable aircraft available-even 
if their Illlssion had yet to be well defined. 
The United States did not produce any aircraft of 
its own design for use at the front durmg World War I; 
nevertheless, the war served as an unpetus for the 1Dfant 
mdustry and gave several arrcraft companies their start. 
Most wartime production revolved around the manufacture 
of trammg aircraft, of the British De Havilland DH-4 
bombers and reconnaISsance aircraft, and of aircraft eng1Des, 
where the automobile compaD1es dominated (Brady, 2000). 
Federal policy durmg the war dictated that the government 
should not rely exclusively on pnvate mdustry for all its 
aircraft needs as a direct result of the past decade of patent 
squabbles. Consequently, the U.S. government established 
the Naval Aircraft Factory (NAF) at the Philadelphia 
Shipyards to design and produce wartime aircraft as well as 
serve as a check on mdustry costs and profits. Although 
mdustry resISted its establishment and its mtrus10n mto the 
pnvate sector, the NAF succeeded m des1gnmg and 
producmg a number of naval airplanes. Its production 
mcluded 50 Curtiss H-16s, and a total wartime production 
of 183 flymg boats plus spare parts for the craft (U.S. 
Centenmal of Flight C0Illllllss10n, 2005). 
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Conclusion 
History ts not especially kmd to the Wnght 
brothers where the airplane bus10ess is concerned. Therr 
arrcraft company did not prosper; it struggled along for SIX 
years until it was finally sold (Kelly, 1989). Dunng that 
time, the firm lost its technological lead and Wnght 
airplanes became hopelessly obsolete. The brothers 
alienated much of the aviation community with therr patent 
lawsuits and then, when they won those suits Orville 
alienated the 10vestors 10 the Wnght Company by refus10g 
to take full advantage oftherr legal position. Consequently, 
many htstonans judge Wilbm and Orville Wnght to be as 
The Wright Lawsuit 
10ept 10 bus10ess as they were brilliant 10 engmeenng. Sadly, 
therr obstinacy led to a strategic disadvantage for the United 
States 10 World War I. If the promise to "darken the skies 
over Germany'' with the "greatest aerial armada ever seen" 
(Hughes, 1919, p. 897) had been able to be fulfilled one 
must wonder how many men on both sides of the conflict 
might have been spared the prolonged misery of the 
trenches. In this we can see that the real losers of the Wnght 
lawsuits were not the aviation pioneers but those who would 
come to depend upon the arrplane as a valued tool 10 the 
swift prosecution of warfare.+ 
David Fre1wald is an assistant professor of aerospace and occupational safety at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Umversity Daytona 
Beach, Flonda. 
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